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ABSTRACT 
 
Nowadays Intrusion Detection System (IDS) which is increasingly a key element of system security is used 
to identify the malicious activities in a computer system or network. There are different approaches being 
employed in intrusion detection systems, but unluckily each of the technique so far is not entirely ideal. The 
prediction process may produce false alarms in many anomaly based intrusion detection systems. With the 
concept of fuzzy logic, the false alarm rate in establishing intrusive activities can be reduced. A set of 
efficient fuzzy rules can be used to define the normal and abnormal behaviors in a computer network. 
Therefore some strategy is needed for best promising security to monitor the anomalous behavior in 
computer network. In this paper I present a few research papers regarding the foundations of intrusion 
detection systems, the methodologies and good fuzzy classifiers using genetic algorithm which are the focus 
of current development efforts and the solution of the problem of Intrusion Detection System to offer a real-
world view of intrusion detection. Ultimately, a discussion of the upcoming technologies and various 
methodologies which promise to improve the capability of computer systems to detect intrusions is offered. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events ([1], [2], [3]) occurring in a computer 
system or network and analyzing them for signs of probable incidents, which are violations or 
forthcoming threats of violation of computer security strategies, adequate used policies, or usual 
security practices. Intrusive events to computer networks are expanding because of the liking of 
adopting the internet and local area networks [4] and new automated hacking tools and strategy. 
Computer systems are evolving to be more and more exposed to attack, due to its wide spread 
network connectivity.  
 
Currently, networked computer systems play an ever more major role in our society and its 
economy. They have become the targets of a wide array of malicious threats that invariably turn 
into real intrusions. This is the reason computer security has become a vital concern for network 
practitioner. Too often, intrusions cause disaster inside LANs and the time and cost to renovate 
the damage can grow to extreme proportions. Instead of using passive measures to repair and 
patch security hole once they have been exploited, it is more efficient to take up a proactive 
measure to intrusions. 
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Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are primarily focused on identifying probable incidents, 
monitoring information about them, tries to stop them, and reporting them to security 
administrators [5] in real-time environment, and those that exercise audit data with some delay 
(non-real-time). The latter approach would in turn delay the instance of detection. In addition, 
organizations apply IDSs for other reasons, such as classifying problems with security policies, 
documenting existing attacks, and preventing individuals from violating security policies. IDSs 
have become a basic addition to the security infrastructure of almost every organization. A usual 
Intrusion Detection System is demonstrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The arrow lines symbolize the amount of information flowing from one component to another 
 
Figure 1. Very Simple Intrusion Detection System 
 
Intrusion Detection Systems are broadly classified into two types. They are host-based and 
network-based intrusion detection systems. Host-based IDS employs audit logs and system calls 
as its data source, whereas network-based IDS employs network traffic as its data source. A host-
based IDS consists of an agent on a host which identifies different intrusions by analyzing audit 
logs, system calls, file system changes (binaries, password files, etc.), and other related host 
activities. In network-based IDS, sensors are placed at strategic position within the network 
system to capture all incoming traffic flows and analyze the contents of the individual packets for 
intrusive activities such as denial of service attacks, buffer overflow attacks, etc. Each approach 
has its own strengths and weaknesses. Some of the attacks can only be detected by host-based or 
only by network-based IDS.   
 
The two main techniques used by Intrusion Detection Systems for detecting attacks are Misuse 
Detection and Anomaly Detection. In a misuse detection system, also known as signature based 
detection system; well known attacks are represented by signatures. A signature is a pattern of 
activity which corresponds to intrusion. The IDS identifies intrusions by looking for these 
patterns in the data being analyzed. The accuracy of such a system depends on its signature 
database. Misuse detection cannot detect novel attacks as well as slight variations of known 
attacks.  
 
An anomaly-based intrusion detection system inspects ongoing traffic, malicious activities, 
communication, or behavior for irregularities on networks or systems that could specify an attack. 
The main principle here is that the attack behavior differs enough from normal user behavior that 
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it cannot be detected by cataloging and identifying the differences involved. By creating supports 
of standard behavior, anomaly-based IDS can view when current behaviors move away 
statistically from the normal one. This capability gives the anomaly-based IDS ability to detect 
new attacks for which the signatures have not been created. The main disadvantage of this 
method is that there is no clear cut method for defining normal behavior. Therefore, such type of 
IDS can report intrusion, even when the activity is legitimate. 
 
One of the major problems encountered by IDS is large number of false positive alerts that is the 
alerts that are mistakenly analyzed normal traffic as security violations. An ideal IDS does not 
produce false or inappropriate alarms. In practice, signature based IDS found to produce more 
false alarms than expected. This is due to the very general signatures and poor built in verification 
tool to authenticate the success of the attack. The large amount of false positives in the alert logs 
generates the course of taking corrective action for the true positives, i.e. delayed, successful 
attacks, and labor intensive. 
 
My goal is to detect novel attacks by unauthorized users in network traffic. I consider an attack to 
be novel if the vulnerability is unknown to the target's owner or administrator, even if the attack 
is generally known and patches and detection tests are available. I mostly like to cite four types of 
remotely launched attacks: denial of service (DOS), U2R, R2L, and probes. A DoS attack is a 
type of attack in which the unauthorized users build a computing or memory resources too busy 
or too full to provide reasonable networking requests and hence denying users access to a 
machine e.g. ping of death, neptune, back, smurf, apache, UDP storm, mail bomb etc. are all DoS 
attacks. A remote to user (U2R) attack is an attack in which a user forwards networking packets 
to a machine through the internet, which he/she does not have right of access in order to expose 
the machines vulnerabilities and exploit privileges which a local user would have on the computer 
e.g. guest, xlock, xnsnoop, sendmail dictionary, phf  etc. A R2L attacks are regarded as the 
exploitations in which the unauthorized users start off on the system with a normal user account 
and tries to misuse vulnerabilities in the system in order to achieve super user access rights e.g. 
xterm, perl. A probing is an attack in which the hacker scans a machine or a networking device in 
order to determine weaknesses or vulnerabilities that may later be exploited so as to negotiate the 
system. This practice is commonly used in data mining e.g. portsweep, saint, mscan, nmap etc. 
 
The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is also carried out by implementing Genetic Algorithm 
(GA) to efficiently identify various types of network intrusions. The genetic algorithm [1] is 
applied to achieve a set of classification rules from the support-confidence framework, and 
network audit data is employed as fitness function to judge the quality of each rule. The created 
rules are then used to classify or detect network intrusions in a real-time framework. Unlike most 
available GA-based approaches remained in the system, because of the easy demonstration of 
rules and the efficient fitness function, the proposed system is very simple to employ while 
presenting the flexibility to either generally detect network intrusions or precisely classify the 
types of attacks. 
 
The normal and the abnormal intrusive activities in networked computers are tough to forecast as 
the boundaries cannot be well explained. This prediction process may generate false alarms [1] in 
many anomaly based intrusion detection systems. However, with the introduction of fuzzy logic, 
the false alarm rate in determining intrusive activities can be minimized; a set of fuzzy rules (non-
crisp fuzzy classifiers) can be employed to identify the normal and abnormal behavior in 
computer networks, and fuzzy inference logic can be applied over such rules to determine when 
an intrusion is in progress. The main problem with this process is to make good fuzzy classifiers 
to detect intrusions. 
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It has been shown by Baruah [6] that a fuzzy number [a, b, c] is concluded with reference to a 
membership function μ(x) remaining within the range between 0 and 1, a ≤ x ≤ c. Further, he has 
extended this definition in the following way. Let μ1(x) and μ2(x) be two functions, 0 ≤ μ2(x) ≤ 
μ1(x) ≤ 1. He has concluded μ1(x) the fuzzy membership function, and μ2(x) a reference 
function, such that (μ1(x) – μ2(x)) is the fuzzy membership value for any x. Finally he has 
characterized such a fuzzy number by {x, μ1(x), μ2(x); x ∈ Ω}.  
 
The complement of µx is always counted from the ground level in Zadehian’s theory [9], whereas 
it actually counted from the level if it is not as zero that is the surface value is not always zero. If 
other than zero, the problem arises and then we have to count the membership value from the 
surface for the complement of µx.  
 
In Figure 2, Baruah [6] explained that for a fuzzy number A = [a, b, c], the value of membership 
for any x ∈ Ω is specified by μ(x) for a ≤ x ≤ c, and is taken as zero otherwise. For the fuzzy 
number AC, the value of membership for any x ∈ Ω is given by (1 - μ(x)) for a ≤ x ≤ c, otherwise, 
the value is 1. The main difference is that for AC the membership function holds 1 all over the 
place with the reference function being μ(x), whereas for A the membership function is μ(x) with 
the reference function being 0 everywhere. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Extended definition of Fuzzy Set 
 
This proposed system forwarded a definition of complement of an extended fuzzy set in which 
the fuzzy reference function is not always taken as zero. The definition of complement of a fuzzy 
set forwarded by Baruah ([6], [7]), Neog and Sut [8] could be viewed a particular case of what I 
am proposing. I would use Baruah’s definition of the complement of a normal fuzzy set in my 
work. 
 
 
2. INTRUSION DETECTION STRATEGIES 
 
The intrusion detection strategies concerns four primary issues. First is the dataset that is captured 
from network communications. The second is Genetic  Algorithms (GA) which use mutation, 
recombination, and selection applied to a population of individuals in order to evolve iteratively 
better and better solutions and a way to generate fuzzy rules to characterize normal and abnormal 
behavior of network systems.  The third is to generate alerts and reports for malicious traffic 
behavior, and the fourth is the maintenance of the ids for observation of placement of sensors, and 
qualified trained intrusion analysts so that the latest malicious traffic is being detected. 
 
 
A 
µ(x) 
Complement of 
A 1- µ(x) 
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2.1. The Dataset 
 
To implement the algorithm and to evaluate the performance of the system, I propose the standard 
datasets employed in KDD Cup 1999 “Computer Network Intrusion Detection” competition. 
 
The KDD 99 intrusion detection datasets depends on the 1998 DARPA proposal, which offers 
designers of intrusion detection systems (IDS) with a standard on which to evaluate different 
methodologies ([21], [24]). Hence, a simulation is being prepared from a fabricated military 
network with three ‘target’ machines running various services and operating systems. They also 
applied three extra machines to spoof different IP addresses for generating network traffic. 
 
A connection is a series of TCP packets beginning and ending at some well defined periods, 
between which data floods from a source IP address to a target IP address under some well 
defined protocol ([21], [22], [24]). It results in 41 features for each connection. 
 
Finally, there remains a sniffer that accounts all network traffic by means of the TCP dump 
format [24]. The total simulated period is seven weeks. Normal connections are shaped to outline 
that expected in a military network and attacks are categorized into one of four types: User to 
Root; Remote to Local; Denial of Service; and Probe. 
 
The KDD 99 intrusion detection benchmark consists of different components [23]: 
 
kddcup.data; kddcup.data_10_percent; kddcup.newtestdata_10_percent_unlabeled; 
 
kddcup.testdata.unlabeled; kddcup.testdata.unlabeled_10_percent; corrected. 
 
I propose to use “kddcup.data_10_percent” as training dataset and “corrected” as testing dataset. 
In this case the training set consists of 494,021 records among which 97,280 are normal 
connection records, while the test set contains 311,029 records among which 60,593 are normal 
connection records. Table 1 shows the intrusion types distribution in the training and the testing 
datasets. 
Table 1. Intrusion types distribution in datasets 
 
Dataset normal prob
e 
Dos u2r r2l Total 
Train 
(“kddcup.data_10_percent”) 
97280 4107 391458 52 1124 494021 
Test (“corrected”) 60593 4166 229853 228 16189 311029 
 
2.2. Genetic algorithm 
 
2.2.1. Genetic algorithm overview 
 
A Genetic Algorithm (GA) is a programming technique that uses biological evolution as a 
problem solving strategy [20]. It is based on Darwinian’s theory of evolution and survival of 
fittest to make effective a population of candidate result near a predefined fitness [13]. 
 
The proposed GA based intrusion detection system holds two modules where each acts in a 
dissimilar stage. In the training stage, a set of classification rules are produced from network audit 
data using the GA in an offline background. In the intrusion detection phase, the generated rules 
are employed to classify incoming network connections in the real-time environment. Once the 
rules are generated, the intrusion detection system becomes simple, experienced and efficient one. 
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GA applies an evolution and natural selection that employs a chromosome-like data structure and 
evolve the chromosomes by means of selection, recombination and mutation operators [13]. The 
process generally starts with randomly generated population of chromosomes, which signify all 
possible solution of a problem that are measured candidate solutions. From each chromosome 
different positions are set as bits, characters or numbers. These positions are regarded as genes. 
An evaluation function is employed to find the decency of each chromosome according to the 
required solution; this function is known as “Fitness Function”. During the process of evaluation 
“Crossover” is applied to have natural reproduction and “Mutation” is applied to mutation of 
species [13]. For survival and combination the selection of chromosomes is partial towards the 
fittest chromosomes. 
 
When I use GA for solving various problems three factors will have crucial impact on the use of 
the algorithm and also of the applications [2]. The factors are : i) the fitness function, ii) the 
representation of individuals, and iii) the genetic algorithm parameters. The determination of 
these factors often depends on implementation of the system. 
 
2.2.2 Fuzzy logic 
 
Zadeh explained that Fuzzy logic [9] is an extension of Boolean logic that is often used for 
computer-based complex decision making. While in classical Boolean logic an element can be 
either a full member or non-member of a Boolean (sometimes called ”crisp”) set, the membership 
of an element to a fuzzy set can be any value within the interval [0, 1], allowing also partial 
membership of an element in a set. 
 
A fuzzy expert system consists of three different types of entities: fuzzy sets, fuzzy variables and 
fuzzy rules. The membership of a fuzzy variable in a fuzzy set is determined by a function that 
produces values within the interval [0, 1]. These functions are called membership functions. 
Fuzzy variables are divided into two groups: antecedent variables, that are assigned with the input 
data of the fuzzy expert system and consequent variables, that are assigned with the results 
computed by the system. 
 
The fuzzy rules determine the link between the antecedent and the consequent fuzzy variables, 
and are often defined using natural language linguistic terms. For instance, a fuzzy rule can be ”if 
the temperature is cold and the wind is strong then wear warm clothes”, where temperature and 
wind are antecedent fuzzy variables, wear is a consequent fuzzy variable and cold, strong and 
warm clothes are fuzzy sets. 
 
The process of a fuzzy system has three steps. These steps are Fuzzification, Rule Evaluation, and 
Defuzzification. In the fuzzification step, the input crisp values are transformed into degrees of 
membership in the fuzzy sets. The degree of membership of each crisp value in each fuzzy set is 
determined by plugging the value into the membership function associated with the fuzzy set. In 
the rule evaluation step, each fuzzy rule is assigned with a strength value. The strength is 
determined by the degrees of memberships of the crisp input values in the fuzzy sets of 
antecedent part of the fuzzy rule. The defuzzification stage transposes the fuzzy outputs into crisp 
values.  
 
It has been revealed by Baruah [6] that a fuzzy number [a, b, c] can be explained with reference 
to a membership function μ(x) remaining between 0 and 1, a ≤ x ≤ c. Further, he has extended 
this definition in the following way. Let μ1(x) and μ2(x) be two functions, 0 ≤ μ2(x) ≤ μ1(x) ≤ 1. 
He has concluded μ1(x) the fuzzy membership function, and μ2(x) a reference function, such that 
(μ1(x) – μ2(x)) is the fuzzy membership value for any x. Finally he has characterized such a 
fuzzy number by {x, μ1(x), μ2(x); x ∈ Ω}. 
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The complement of µx is always counted from the ground level in Zadehian’s theory [9], whereas 
it actually counted from the level if it is not as zero that is the surface value is not always zero. If 
other than zero, the problem arises and then we have to count the membership value from the 
surface for the complement of µx. Thus I could conclude the following   statement – 
 
Complement of µx = 1 for the entire level 
 
Membership value for the complement of µx = 1- µx 
 
I have forwarded Baruah’s definition of complement of an extended fuzzy set where the fuzzy 
reference function is not always taken as zero. The definition of complement of a fuzzy set 
recommend by Baruah ([6], [7]), Neog and Sut [8] could be considered a particular case of what I 
am giving. I would use Baruah’s definition of the complement of a normal fuzzy set in my 
proposed work. 
 
In the two classes’ classification problem, two classes are available where every object should be 
classified. These classes are called positive (abnormal) and negative (normal). The data set 
employed by the learning algorithms holds a set of objects where each object contains n+1 
attributes. The first n attributes identifies the monitored parameters of the object characteristics 
and the last attribute identifies the class where the object belongs to the classification attribute. 
A fuzzy classifier is a set of two rules for solving the two classes’ classification problem, one for 
the normal class and other for the abnormal class, where the conditional part is described by 
means of only the monitored parameters and the conclusion part is viewed as an atomic 
expression for the classification attribute. 
 
2.2.3 Fitness function 
 
The authors in [1] used the fuzzy confusion matrix to calculate the fitness of a chromosome. In 
the fuzzy confusion matrix the fuzzy truth degree of the condition represented by the 
chromosome and the fuzzy negation operator are used directly. The fitness of a chromosome for 
the abnormal class is evaluated according to the following set of equations: 
 
TP = ∑ predicted (class_datai) 
 
TN = ∑1 –  predicted (other_class_datai) 
 
FP = ∑ predicted (other_class_datai) 
 
FN = ∑ 1– predicted (class_datai) 
 
Where, 
 
Sensitivity = TP/(TP+FN) 
Specificity = FP/( FP+ TN) 
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Length = 1 – chromosome_length/10 
 
So finally Fitness of a chromosome is calculated as follows – 
 
Fitness = W1 * Sensitivity + W2 * Specificity + W3 * Length 
 
Where, 
TP, TN, FP, FN are true positive, true negative, false positive, false negative value for the rule, p 
is the number of samples of the evolved class in the training data set, q is the number of samples 
of the remaining class in the training data set, predicted is the fuzzy value of the conditional part 
of the rule, class_datai  is  an element of the subset of the training samples of  the evolved class, 
other_class_datai is an element of the subset of the remaining classes in the   training samples, 
and W1, W2, W3 are the  assigned weights for each rule characteristics respectively. 
 
2.3 Generate alerts and reports 
 
The reports portraits an entire image of the status of the network under observation. It handles all 
the output from the system, whether that be an automated response to the suspicious activity, or 
which is most common, the notification of some security officer. IDSs should provide facilities 
for practitioners to fine-tune thresholds for generating alarms as well as facilities for suppressing 
alarms selectively.  
 
Reporting can demonstrate the economic value of the monitoring tools. It can also ease the 
burden of monitoring. The IDS should generate reports that help practitioners investigate the 
alarms. In addition, the intrusion detection system can assist network practitioners prioritize their 
tasks, by assigning priorities to alarms, or providing each alarm to a practitioner for further 
investigation. 
 
2.4 IDS Maintenance 
 
2.4.1 Maintenance 
 
IDS maintenance is essential for all IDS technologies because all sorts of threats and prevention 
technologies are constantly varying, patches, signatures, and configurations must be modernized 
to ensure that the latest malicious traffic is being detected and prevented. We could maintain IDS 
from a console using a graphical user interface (GUI), application, or secure web-based interface. 
Network administrators could monitor IDS components from the console to make sure they are 
operational, validate they are working properly, and carry out vulnerability assessments (VA) and 
updates. 
 
2.4.2 Tuning 
 
To be effective in detection policy, IDS must be tuned precisely. Tuning requires varying 
different settings to be in conformity with the security guiding principles and objective of the IDS 
administrator. Scanning techniques, thresholds, and focus can be regulated to make certain that 
anIDS is making out relevant data without overloading the network administrator with warnings 
or too many false positives. Tuning is time-consuming, but it must be performed to make sure an 
efficient IDS configuration. It is to be noted that tuning must be specific to the IDS product only. 
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2.4.3 Detection Accuracy 
 
The accuracy of intrusion detection system relies on the technique in which it identifies, such as 
by the rule set. Signature-based detection detects only simple and recognized attacks, while 
anomaly-based detection can detect more types of attacks, but has a higher number of false 
positives ratios. Tuning is essential to reduce the number of false positives and to make the data 
further functional. 
 
3. CHALLENGES IN IDS 
 
There are number of challenges that impact on organization’s decision to use IDS. In this section 
I have described a few challenges that the organizations encounter while installing an intrusion 
detection system. These are discussed below – 
 
1. Human intervention - IDS technology itself is experiencing a lot of enhancements. It is 
therefore very important for organizations to clearly define their prospect from the IDS 
implementation. Till now IDS technology has not achieved a level where it does not 
require human interference. Of course today's IDS technology recommends some 
automation like reporting the administrator in case of detection of a malicious activity, 
avoiding the malicious connection for a configurable period of time, dynamically 
changing a router's access control list in order to prevent a malicious connection etc. 
Therefore the security administrator must investigate the attack once it is detected and 
reported, determine how it occurred, correct the problem and take necessary action to 
prevent the occurrence of the same attack in future.  
 
2. Historical analysis - It is still very important factor to monitor the IDS logs regularly to 
continue on top of the incidence of events. Monitoring the logs on a daily basis is 
necessary to analyze the different type of malicious activities detected by the IDS over a 
period of time. Today's IDS has not yet achieved the level where it can provide historical 
analysis of the intrusive activities detected over a span of time. This is still a manual 
activity. 
 
Hence it is vital for an organization to have a distinct incident handling and response plan 
if an intrusion is detected and reported by the IDS. Also, the organization should have 
expert security personnel to handle this kind of situation. 
 
3. Deployment - The success of an IDS implementation depends to a large degree on how it 
has been deployed. A lot of plan is necessary in the design as well as the implementation 
phase. In most cases, it is required to apply a fusion solution of network based and host 
based IDS to gain from both cases. In fact one technology complements the other. 
 
However, this decision can differ from one organization to another. A network based IDS 
is an instant choice for many organizations because of its capability to monitor multiple 
systems and also the truth that it does not need a software to be loaded on a production 
system different from host based IDS. 
 
Some organizations implement a hybrid solution. Organizations installing host based IDS 
solution needs remember that the host based IDS software is processor and memory 
challenging. So it is very important to have sufficient available resources on a system 
before establishing a host based sensor on it. 
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4. Sensors - It is important to maintain sensor to manager ratio. There is no strict rule as 
such for calculating this ratio. To a large degree it depends upon how many different 
types of traffic is monitored by each sensor and in which background. Most of the 
organizations deploy a ratio of 10:1, while some organizations maintain 20:1 and some 
others go for 15:1. 
 
It is very important to plan the baseline strategy before starting the IDS implementation 
and avoid false positives. A poorly configured IDS sensor may post a lot of false positive 
ratios to the console and even a ratio of 10:1 or even enough better sensors to the console 
ratio can be missing. 
 
5. False positive and negative alarms rate – It is impossible for IDS to be ideal mostly 
because network traffic is so complicated. The erroneous results in IDS are divided into 
two types: false positives and false negatives. False positives take place when the IDS 
erroneously identify a problem with benign traffic. False negatives occur when redundant 
traffic is overlooked by the IDS. Both create problems for security administrators or 
practitioners and demands that the malicious threats must be detected powerfully. A 
greater number of false positives are generally more acceptable but can burden a security 
administrator with bulky amounts of data to filter through. However, because it is 
unnoticed, false negatives do not provide a security administrator a chance to check the 
data. Therefore IDS to be implemented should minimize both false positive and negative 
alarms. 
 
6. Signature database - A common policy for IDS in detecting intrusions is to remember 
signatures of known attacks. The inherent weak points in relying on signatures are that 
the signature patterns must be acknowledged first. New threats are often unrecognizable 
by eminent and popular IDS. Signatures can be masked as well. The ongoing event 
between new attacks and detection systems has been a challenge. Therefore the signature 
database must be updated whenever a different kind of attack is detected and repair for 
the same is available. 
 
 
7. Monitor traffic in large networks - Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) 
components are spotted throughout a network, but if not placed tactically, many attacks 
can altogether avoid NIDS sensors by passing through alternate ways in a network. 
Moreover, though many IDS products available in the market are efficient to distinguish 
different types of attacks, they may fail to recognize attacks that use many attack sources. 
Many IDS cannot cleverly correlate data from numerous sources. Newer IDS 
technologies must influence integrated systems to increase an overview of distributed 
intrusive activity. Therefore IDS must be able to successfully monitor traffic in a large 
network. 
 
4. PRIOR WORKS 
 
In this section, I describe the important and relevant research works of different authors that I 
have come across during the literature survey of my proposed work. I illustrate each attack 
manner and point to the impact of this attack and its intrusive activities. From an intruder’s point 
of view, I analyze each of the attack’s modes, intention, benefits and suitable conditions and try 
to find out the solution how to improve the attack by introducing the concept of fuzzy logic-based 
technique and genetic algorithm. 
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The normal and abnormal behaviors [1] in networked computers are hard to forecast, as the limits 
cannot be explained clearly. This prediction method usually generates fake alarms in many 
anomaly based intrusion detection systems.  
 
In [1] the authors introduced the concept of fuzzy logic to reduce the fake alarm rate in 
determining intrusive behavior. The set of fuzzy rules is applied to identify the normal and 
abnormal behavior in a computer network. The authors proposed a technique to generate fuzzy 
rules that are able to detect malicious activities and some specific intrusions. This system 
presented a novel approach for the presentation of generated fuzzy rules in classifying different 
types of intrusions. 
 
The advantage of their proposed mechanism is that the fuzzy rules are able to detect the malicious 
activities. 
 
But they failed to implement the real time network traffic, more attributes for the classification 
rules. In determining the fuzzy rules, they used the concept of fuzzy membership function and 
reference function, but they said that the membership function and reference function are same. In 
reality, these two concepts are totally different concepts. I have forwarded the extended definition 
of fuzzy set of Baruah ([6], [7]), Neog and Sut [8]. 
 
In [9] Zadeh initiated the idea of fuzzy set theory and it was mainly intended mathematically to 
signify uncertainty and vagueness with formalized logical tools for dealing with the vagueness 
connected in many real world problems. The membership value to a fuzzy set of an element 
describes a function called membership function where the universe of discourse is the domain 
and the interval lies in the range [0, 1]. The value 0 means that the element is not a member of the 
fuzzy set; the value 1 means that the element is fully a member of the fuzzy set. The values that 
remain between 0 and 1 distinguish fuzzy members, which confined to the fuzzy set merely 
partially. 
 
But the author gave an explanation that the fuzzy membership value and fuzzy membership 
function for the complement of a fuzzy set are same concepts and the surface value is always 
counted from the ground level.  
 
Baruah ([6], [7]), Neog and Sut [8] have forwarded an extended definition of fuzzy set which 
enables us to define the complement of a fuzzy set. My proposed system agrees with them as this 
new definition satisfies all the properties regarding the complement of a fuzzy set. 
 
In [2] Gong, Zulkernine, Abolmaesumi gave an implementation of genetic based approach to 
Network Intrusion Detection using genetic algorithm and showed software implementation to 
detect the malicious activities. The approach derived a set of classification rules from network 
audit data and utilizes a support-confidence framework to judge the quality of each rule. The 
generated rules are then used in intrusion detection system to detect and to classify network 
intrusions efficiently in a real-time environment.  
 
But, some limitations of their implemented method are observed. First, the generated rules were 
partial to the training dataset. Second, though the support-confidence framework is simple to 
implement and provides improved accuracy to final rules, it requires the whole training datasets 
to be loaded into memory before any computation. For large training datasets, it is neither 
efficient nor feasible. 
 
In [12] Hoque, Mukit and Bikas presented an implementation of Intrusion Detection System by 
applying the theory of genetic algorithm to efficiently detect various types of network intrusive 
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activities. To apply and measure the efficiency of their system they used the standard KDD 99 
intrusion detection benchmark dataset and obtained realistic detection rate. To measure the fitness 
of a chromosome they used the standard deviation equation with distance.  
 
But their performance of detection rate was poor and they failed to reduce the false positive rate 
in Intrusion Detection System. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have described an overview of some of the current and past intrusion detection 
technologies which are being utilized for the detection of intrusive activities against computer 
systems or networks. The different detection challenges that affect the decision policy of the IDS 
employed in an organization are clearly outlined. I propose to use the new definition of the 
complement of fuzzy sets where the fuzzy membership value and fuzzy membership function for 
the complement of a fuzzy set are two different concepts because the surface value is not always 
counted from the ground level. This new definition of fuzzy sets can classify efficient rule sets. 
This would help in reducing the false alarm rate occurred in intrusion detection system.  
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